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| Date: | Sunday 14 January 1996 |
| Time: | c. 12:03 LT |
| Type: |  Boeing 747-436 |
| Owner/operator: | British Airways |
| Registration: | G-BNLE |
| MSN: | 24047/753 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1989 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Location: | St. Athan Airport (DGX/EGSY) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | Ferry/positioning |
| Departure airport: | London-Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL) |
| Cardiff Airport (CWL/EGFF) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The aircraft was being flown, without passengers, on a positioning flight from London Heathrow to
Cardiff for maintenance. The weather at Cardiff was surface wind 120°/10 kt, visibility 5 km with nil
weather, VMC to the south of the airfield and IMC to the north.
At 1154 hrs the aircraft was transferred from Bristol to Cardiff approach Control and was identified
on radar 5 nm to the north of Bristol on a radar heading of 290°. The commander's request for radar
vectors to a downwind left-hand circuit to Runway 12 was acknowledged by the Cardiff controller
and he was instructed to maintain 3,000 feet on the Cardiff QNH. The commander also advised
Cardiff that he had copied ATIS information 'L'. Information 'M' timed at 1150 hrs gave the surface
wind as 120°/18 kt, visibility 20 km with nil weather, 1/8 cloud at 1,200 feet and3/8 cloud at 4,800
feet.
At 1156 hrs, with the aircraft 9 nm north-east of Cardiff descending to 2,500 feet, the commander
was asked if he had the airfield in sight. The commander confirmed that he did and was given
clearance to "CONTINUE DOWNWIND LEFT-HAND FOR A VISUAL APPROACH TO RUNWAY 12 NOT
BELOW 2,500 FEET UNTIL ADVISED BY TOWER,THE CIRCUIT IS ACTIVE AND SAINT ATHAN ALSO
ACTIVE TO THE SOUTH-WEST". A few moments later the aircraft entered some low cloud and the
crew asked for radar vectors. The controller acknowledged this request and instructed the aircraft to
turn onto a heading of 300° for vectors to the ILS. The controller also transmitted that he would
position the aircraft outbound for about 6 nm and then turn it onto a left base. At 1159 hrs, on the
controller's instruction, the aircraft descended to 1,700 feet and turned onto a heading of 230°. The
controller asked the commander "WILL SIX MILE FINAL BE TOO TIGHT?". The commander
replied "FINE". At 1202 hrs the controller could see that the aircraft was approaching the extended
centerline just inside 6 nm and gave the commander clearance to "DESCEND WITH THE ILS OR
VISUALLY AS YOU WISH, BE ADVISED SAINT ATHAN TO THE SOUTH OF THE APPROACH TRACK IS
ACTIVE; CONTACT THE TOWER".
A few moments later the crew transmitted on Cardiff Tower frequency "WE SEEM TO BE WELL
DISPLACED TO THE LEFT OF THE RUNWAY WE'RE GOING AROUND TO THE RIGHT". The crew then
added "WE SEEM TO BE VECTORED INSIDE THE TOWER ARE WE CLEAR TO TURN AND RE-ESTABLISH
ON FINAL?". The controller then transmitted "JUST CONFIRM YOU'RE GOING FOR RUNWAY 12 AT
CARDIFF NOT RUNWAY 08 SAINT ATHAN?". The crew replied "WE'RE GOING FOR RUNWAY 12".
The aircraft commander subsequently told the controller that he would like to turn to the right onto a
southerly heading and be re-vectored for another approach. The aircraft was transferred back to the
approach frequency and an approach and landing at Cardiff was flown without further incident.
An investigation carried out by the operating company showed that as the aircraft turned onto base
leg at 1,500 feet the visibility reduced in an area of low cloud. Furthermore forward visibility was
further reduced as the aircraft faced into sun. Ground contact was maintained by the crew but they
lost contact with the airfield. Runway 08 at St Athan however was observed by the crew and
the aircraft was repositioned for an approach onto that runway. At 1,000 feet the crew realised their
mistake and a go-around was initiated.
The company considered the following factors as contributory to the incident:
1. A lack of practice in conducting visual circuits.
2. Failure to confirm the aircraft's position using all navigational equipment available.
3. No warning was published on the Aerad letdown chart, used by the crew, informing them of the
presence of St Athan Airfield on short finals to Cardiff.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f094e5274a1314000307/dft_avsafety_pdf_500078.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/7017520 (Photo)
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 09-Aug-2025 21:20 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 09-Aug-2025 21:20 | Justanormalperson | Updated [Accident report, ] |
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