Incident McDonnell Douglas MD-83 EP-ZAQ,
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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 386794
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Date:Saturday 30 December 2023
Time:08:59 UTC
Type:Silhouette image of generic MD83 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
McDonnell Douglas MD-83
Owner/operator:Zagros Airlines
Registration: EP-ZAQ
MSN: 49769
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 136
Aircraft damage: None
Location:near Qeshm Island, Islamic Republic of Iran. -   Iran
Phase: Approach
Nature:Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi
Departure airport:Tehran-Mehrabad Airport (THR/OIII)
Destination airport:Qeshm International Airport (IATA: GSM, ICAO: OIKQ)
A Zagros Airlines McDonnell Douglas MD-83, registration EP-ZAQ performing flight ZO-4035 from Tehran Mehrabad to Queshm (Iran) with 127 passengers and 9 crew, was on approach to Queshm's runway 05 but aimed for a local airstrip 5nm from Queshm's Internation Airport. After the controller queried the crew, the crew initiated a go around, then spotted the correct runway, joined a downwind and landed without further incident on the correct runway.

Iran's CAA released their final report concluding the probable causes of the incident were:

1) Lack of the knowledge of the pilots about existence strip in Qeshm Island,

2) Some pilots of the airline were aware about the strip but no operational warning was issued.

3) Choosing wrong intercepting heading to perform NDB plan turning to the final of RWY05,

4) Failure to use FMS facilities after leaving IAF position,

5) Fluctuation of ADF needle in RMI of the aircraft due to error in NDB aids to navigation in the shore line,

6) Inaccuracy and insufficient supervision of the pilots over the flight instrument,

7) Failure to comply with the standard procedures in accordance with OM-A/OM-B/FCOM (failure to use the automation system), and

8) Lack of CRM and proper communication between the pilot in command and the copilot in accordance with OM-A and OM-B regulations and failure using the Standard Callout, mentioned in the company’s regulations on “disagreement between pilot in command and copilot on recognizing the correct RWY”.


Revision history:

22-Apr-2024 07:37 Bandit Added

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description

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